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Case No. 20090839-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Respondent,
vs.

Lemuel Prion,
Defendant/ Petitioner.

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78 A-3-102(3)(a) (West
2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
This Court granted the petition on the following issue:
Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the denial of
Petitioner's rule 22(e) challenge to his re-sentencing.
See Order, dated 20 January 2010 (a copy is attached in Addendum A).
Standard ofReview. On certiorari, this Court reviews "the decision of the court
of appeals, not the decision of the district court/' Utah Co. v. Butler, 2008 UT 12, % 9,
179 P.3d 775 (quotation marks and citations omitted). "The correctness of the court
of appeals' decision turns on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's

decision under the appropriate standard of review/' Id. (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Procedural and constitutional questions present questions of law
reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial court's ruling. See Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 25,100 P.3d 1177.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are attached in Addendum B.Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104 (Supp. 1994);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203 (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Sixteen years ago, in August 1994, Defendant pleaded guilty and mentally ill
[G AMI] at a single hearing to charges in two separate criminal cases. R. 4-5. In Case
Number 941800068, he pleaded guilty to possession of a dangerous weapon in a
correctional facility, a second-degree felony. R. 4-5,48. In this case (Case Number
931800470), he pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and dealer in possession
without affixing a tax stamp, both third-degree felonies.1 Id.

1

The record from the original proceeding (Case No. 931800470) was
destroyed "pursuant to Record Retention schedule" nearly fourteen years after
entry of Defendant's guilty plea. R. 1. The remaining trial record is before this
Court in a green folder. The State cites primarily to documents in that folder and
includes in Addendum C part of the docket from this case involving both the trial
court's sentencing decisions. The appellate record also contains the record from
Defendant's second criminal case (Case No. 941800068), located in a red folder.
Citation to that record, where necessary, is "RR.
."
2

At the plea hearing, Judge John R. Anderson heard testimony from Dr. Robert
J. Howell, PhD., concerning Defendant's mental status and his medication situation.
R. 5,48. The judge ruled that Defendant was mentally ill, finding:
1. That the Defendant poses an immediate physical danger to
himself or others, including jeopardizing his own or others' safety,
health, or welfare if placed in a correctional or probation setting, or
lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities of life, such as food,
clothing, and shelter, if placed on probation.
2. That until the Defendant's medication is regulated he cannot
be committed to the Department of Corrections.
R. 4,47 (Order stamped 9/1/94, attached in Addendum D); see also Utah Code Ann.
§77-16a-104(3)(a) (Supp. 1994) (identifying the findings required when sentencing a
defendant who is guilty and mentally ill).
In sentencing a mentally ill defendant, section 77-16a-202(l) directed the
sentencing court to impose a term of imprisonment and commit the defendant to the
State Hospital for up to eighteen months or until he reached the maximum benefit,
whichever occurred first. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b). If the sentencing
order included both the commitment and a retention of jurisdiction, then upon
expiration of the State Hospital commitment, the statute directed the judge to "recall
the sentence and commitment, and resentence the offender." Id.
Pursuant to the statute, the judge imposed concurrent statutory sentences of
one-to-fifteen years for the second-degree felony, and zero-to-five years for each of

3

the two third-degree felonies. R. 4, 47. He committed Defendant to the State
Hospital "for care and treatment for not more than eighteen (18) months, or until he
. . . reached [the] maximum benefit[,] whichever occurs first."2 R. 4, 46-47; Utah
Code Ann. §§ 77-16a-202(l)(b) & 77-16a-101(2) (1999). He also expressly ordered
that at the end of the commitment period, "the Defendant shall be brought before
this Court for reconsideration in his sentence." R. 46; Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a202(1)(b). The judge also expressly retained jurisdiction "to alter or amend its
order" and to "resentence" Defendant, as required by section 77-16a-202(l)(b). R. 4,
46; Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b). The court ordered the State Hospital to file a
progress report with the court and the parties every six months. R. 4,46; Utcih Code
Ann. § 77-16a-202(3). No objection to the sentencing order appears in the record.
Five months later, in January 1995, the State Hospital submitted to the court a
written report, prepared in compliance with the statutory directive in Utah Code
Ann. § 77-16a-203 (1999).3 R. 73 (letter date stamped 1/23/95). The report stated
Defendant had "reached maximum hospital benefit[,]" that the hospital could no
2

Dr. Howell recommended the commitment to the State Hospital, in large
part because "two different physicians" were prescribing the many medications
Defendant was taking, and he believed "it would be best to have one physician,
preferably a psychiatrist, managing all of his medications." R. 73 (manila folder,
letter dated September 7,1994).
3

In keeping with Rules 4-202.09(9)(A) and 4-202.02(4)(N), Code of Judicial
Administration, the State does not include details from the report, but refers the
Court to the actual report contained in the appellate record. See R. 73.
4

longer provide Defendant "with treatment, care, custody, and security that is
adequate and appropriate for his condition and needs[,]" and, based in part on its
diagnosis of Defendant, recommended that he "be engaged in some type of sex
offender program."

Id.

The report was accompanied by a "Review and

Recommendation" which briefly outlined Defendant's diagnosis, his violent
conduct and threats toward other patients and hospital staff, his lack of cooperation
with counseling efforts, the concerns voiced by female staff members, and the staff's
belief that Defendant was "very dangerous[.]" Id.; see Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203
(1999).
Upon receiving the State Hospital's report, the court ordered a report and
recommendation from Adult Probation and Parole ("AP&P") to discover "what
programs might be available for [Defendant]." R. 3. The court set a sentencing
hearing for March 1995. Id.
At the March sentencing hearing, Judge Anderson reviewed the reports from
the State Hospital and AP&P and heard from defense counsel and Defendant's
father and brother. R. 2, 44 (Order and Commitment dated 3/15/95, attached in
Addendum E).4 The judge then found that Defendant presented "a serious threat of

4

The order in Addendum E is from Defendant's other case and is offered as
being representative of the order likely entered in this matter. The docket in this
case outlines the resentencing hearing and Judge Anderson's ruling. R. 2-3.
5

violent behavior, with repetitive instances of criminal conduct/' and that he had an
"attitude not conducive to probation[.]" R. 2,44. Citing his responsibility to protect
society, the judge felt compelled to send Defendant to prison.

R. 2, 43-44.

Consequently, he reimposed the same statutory prison terms, but ran all three
sentences consecutively instead of concurrently. R. 2,44.
Nearly twelve years later, in February 2007, Defendant filed a petition for
post-conviction relief, challenging the change at resentencing from concurrent to
consecutive sentences. See Prion v. State, 2007 UT App 163U, *1 ['Prion V]; Prion v.
State, 2008 UT App 189U, *1 n.l ['Prion 3"] (both in Addendum F). The district
court dismissed the petition because "it was barred by the statute of limitations/7
and the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal on appeal. See Prion I at *1. This
Court summarily reversed, directing a remand "to address the interests-of-justice
exception, as well as any other provisions of the PCRA [Post-Conviction Remedies
Act] that have not been considered but may be relevant to its adjudication." Prion v.
State, 2007 UT 80, f 3,171 P.3d 426 ['Prion 2"] (in Addendum F).
.Two months later, in December 2007, the district court dismissed the petition.5
See Prion 3, at *1. The court of appeals dismissed Defendant's appeal from that
dismissal as untimely, but suggested that the sentencing issue he sought to raise

5

The record before this Court does not detail the basis for the dismissal.
6

could be pursued by a motion filed under rule 22(e), Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure. See id. at *1, n.l.
Defendant filed a rule 22(e) motion in each of his criminal cases eight months
later. R. 1, 31-61. He argued, among other things, that changing his concurrent
sentences to consecutive sentences increased his sentence in violation of double
jeopardy. R. 15,54-58, 60-61.
Judge Anderson denied the motion by written order entered on April 13,
2009. R. 1, 15-16 (Ruling and Order on Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence, attached in Addendum G). The judge recognized that the Double
Jeopardy Clause applies only where "the defendant reasonably believes the original
sentence is final/7 R. 15 (citing State v. Maguire, 975 P.2d 476,479 (Utah App. 1999)).
In this case, he reasoned, Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b) expressly permitted the
court to recall the original sentence and commitment and re-sentence Defendant
after his temporary stay in the State Hospital. See id. In light of the express
statutory direction and the fact that the original sentencing order itself reserved
jurisdiction in the court to resentence Defendant, the judge ruled that Defendant
could have had "no reasonable expectation that the September 1,1994, sentence was
final[.]" R. 15-16.
Defendant timely appealed in both cases, and each was assigned a separate
case number. R. 17-18. The appeal in this case was assigned Case No. 20090380—
7

CA, while the appeal in Defendant's other case was assigned Case No. 20090381 —
CA. The latter appeal was dismissed for failure to file a docketing statement.
See RR. 123.
The appeal in this case resulted in a short, unpublished per curiam decision
summarily affirming the lower court's denial of the motion to correct an illegal
sentence. See State v. Prion, 2009 UT App 219U (per curiam) (attached in Addendum
H). The court of appeals agreed that section 77-16a-202(l)(b) expressly directed the
trial court to retain jurisdiction to resentence a GAMI defendant after a brief
commitment to the State Hospital. Id. at ^f 2. The court of appeals also agreed that
"the double jeopardy clause 'only proscribes resentencing where the defendant has
developed a legitimate expectation of the finality in his original sentence/" Id. at f 3
(quoting State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, f 8, 975 P.2d 476). Because the
sentencing court's original sentencing order in this case followed the statutory
directive to "retain[] jurisdiction to alter or amend its originally contemplated
sentence," and because the order "expressly indicated] that Prion's sentence would
be reconsidered once he was released from his mental health treatment[,]" the court
of appeals concluded that Defendant could not have legitimately expected that the
original sentencing order "constituted his final sentence." Id. at \4. Accordingly,
the court found no double jeopardy violation and affirmed the district court's denial
of Defendant's rule 22(e) motion. See id.
8

This Court granted Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
No statement of facts is necessary to a determination of the issues presented
in this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the court of appeals erred in holding that his double
jeopardy rights were not implicated when, pursuant to section 77-16a-202(l)(b), his
original sentence was recalled and he was resentenced to consecutive, rather than
concurrent, terms. First, he claims that the statute permits only a redetermination of
the location of his commitment, not its length. However, the plain, unambiguous
language of the statute provides that if the sentencing order includes a
''commitment and retention of jurisdiction^]" the judge "may recall the sentence
and commitment, and resentence the offender." Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b).
Section 77-16a-104(3) provides a two-step process for sentencing a defendant who is
found to be guilty and mentally ill [GAMI]: (1) imposition of the appropriate
sentence for the crime; and (2) determination of the location of the offender's
commitment.

This interpretation gives meaning to each term used by the

Legislature and permits the sentencing court the flexibility to commit a GAMI
defendant to the State hospital for a short period, and to then use the information
gleaned from that visit to fashion a sentence providing for the most effective mental
9

health treatment and punishment. The sentencing court properly implemented
these statutes consistent with their plain language and imposed a legal sentence.
Second, Defendant claims that the resentencing violated his double jeopardy
rights because he developed a legitimate expectation of finality in the maximum
aggregate term of his original sentence before the resentencing. No such legitimate
expectation arose where the plain language of the G AMI sentencing statutes and the
sentencing court's original sentencing order clearly provided for modification of the
sentence following Defendant's brief commitment to the State Hospital. Absent a
legitimate expectation of finality in the original sentence, double jeopardy
protections are not implicated.
ARGUMENTS
Introduction
This is an appeal from the denial of a rule 22(e) motion challenging the
validity of Defendant's sentencing under Utah's GAMI statutes. See Utah R. Crim.
P. 22(e). Relief under rule 22(e) is appropriate only when a sentence is found to be
illegal or to have been imposed in an illegal manner. See id. An illegal sentence is
narrowly defined as one that is "patently" illegal (State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860
(Utah 1995)), or "manifestly" illegal (State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, | 5, 48 P.3d 228).
But see State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, f 11, 232 P.3d 1008 (an illegal sentence also
includes constitutional violations). A "patently" or "manifestly" illegal sentence
10

generally occurs in one of two situations: (1) where the sentencing court has no
jurisdiction, or (2) where the sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range. See
Telford, 2002 UT 51, f 5, n. 1. But see Candedo, 2010 UT 32, | 13. Defendant's
sentence involves neither situation.
Here, the sentence is, without doubt, within the authorized statutory range. If
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence Defendant, then the resentencing
would be illegal, and Defendant's rule 22(e) motion would be well-taken. See Utah
R. Crim. P. 22(e). The GAMI statutes, however, expressly confer jurisdiction on the
trial court to resentence Defendant under the circumstances of this case. See Point I,
infra. Because the sentencing court retained jurisdiction in its original order as
required by the plain language of section 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court had jurisdiction
when it resentenced Defendant, and the sentence was legal for purposes of rule
22(e), even if a double jeopardy problem existed.6 There was, in fact, no double
jeopardy problem in this case. See Point II, infra.
Defendant challenges the court of appeals' determination that his double
jeopardy rights were not implicated when the trial court recalled his sentence under
section 77-16a-202(l)(b) and resentenced him to the same statutory sentences, but

6

Defendant does not contend that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to
resentence him, only that it could not increase the maximum term of his sentence.
See Aplt. Br. at 6, 7-12.
11

ran them consecutively rather than concurrently. See Aplt. Br. at 7-21. He raises
two main issues: (1) the court of appeals misinterpreted the statute to permit an
increase in the original sentence rather than a change in the location of his
commitment; and (2) the court of appeals erroneously determined that he had no
legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentences.

See id. The State

addresses each claim below.
I.
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE GAMI SENTENCING
STATUTES CONFERS JURISDICTION ON A SENTENCING
COURT TO RESENTENCE THE DEFENDANT TO ANY
LAWFUL SENTENCE FOLLOWING A TEMPORARY
COMMITMENT TO THE STATE HOSPITAL
Defendant first argues that the court of appeals erred in holding that when an
offender, convicted under Utah's Guilty and Mentally 111 ("GAMI") statutes, is
sentenced and committed to the State Hospital for treatment under Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-16a-202(l)(b) (1999), the trial court may resentence that offender to a longer
maximum term so long as the court retained jurisdiction in the original sentencing
order. See Aplt. Br. at 7-21. He contends that section 77-16a-202(l)(b) does not
permit the imposition of an increased maximum sentence, including a change from
concurrent to consecutive sentences. See id. at 8-14. He argues that interpreting the
statute to allow this violates state and federal due process and jury trial rights. See
id.

12

Defendant's interpretation of the statute is contrary to its plain language. His
constitutional arguments are not properly before this Court because they are
unpreserved and unaccompanied by any claim of plain error or exceptional
circumstances.
A. The GAMI Sentencing Statutes Allow a Sentencing Increase
Defendant begins by arguing that the court of appeals should have found that
the sentencing judge lacked authority to increase his sentence by imposing
consecutive rather than concurrent terms because the governing sentencing statutes
permit a change only in where the sentence is served, not its length. See Aplt. Br. at
8-12. In other words, on resentencing, the judge is limited to deciding whether
Defendant should be put on probation, sent to prison, or recommitted to the State
Hospital. See id. at 11 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104(3)). No such limiting
language appears in the statutes, however, and Defendant's argument ignores the
statutes' plain language.
The Plain Language of the G AMI Sentencing Statutes. This Court construes
statutes "'to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the
statute was meant to achieve.'" State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, f 18,193 R3d 92 (quoting
State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,134,52 P.3d 1210). The best evidence of that intent is "'the
plain language of the statute itself.'" Id. (quoting State ex rel Z.C., 2007 UT 54, f 6,
165 P.3d 1206) (citations omitted)); see also State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, f 7, 217 P.3d
13

265. Only if the statutory language is ambiguous does this Court turn to secondary
principles of statutory construction. See Utah Dept of Tramp, v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56,
If22,218 P.3d 583; State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 17, If 11,133 P.3d 396. Moreover, "[w]hen
examining the statutory language, we assume the legislature used each term
advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary meaning'" and avoid any
construction that renders any term superfluous. Miller, 2008 UT 61, |18 (quoting
State ex rel Z.C, 2007 UT 54, Tf 6).
The analysis in this case necessarily begins with section 77-16a-104(3), which
provides for sentencing upon entry of a verdict of guilty and mentally ill. That
section provides that:
(3) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant is currently mentally ill, it shall impose any sentence that
could be imposed under law upon a defendant who is not mentally ill
and who is convicted of the same offense, and:
(a) commit him to the department, in accordance with the
provisions of Section 77-16a-202 . . . ;
(b) order probation in accordance with Section 77-16a-201; or
(c) if the requirements of Subsections (a) and (b) are not met, place
the defendant in the custody of UDC [the Department of
Corrections].

Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104(3) (Supp. 1994). Under the plain language of this
statute, once a judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is

14

mentally ill, he is to 1) impose a legal sentence upon the defendant as if he were not
mentally ill, and 2) determine whether to commit him to prison, probation, or the
State Hospital. See id. In this case, the judge followed this statute by finding
Defendant to be mentally ill, imposing the proper statutory sentence for his offenses,
and then committing him to the State Hospital. R. 46-48.
Because the judge committed Defendant to the State Hospital, section 77~16a104(3)(a) directs him to comply with section 77-16a-202. That provision provides
that:
(1) In sentencing and committing a mentally ill offender to the
department under Subsection 77-16a-104(3)(a), the court shall:

(b) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that
he be committed to the department for care and treatment for no
more than 18 months, or until he has reached maximum benefit,
whichever occurs first. At the expiration of that time, the court
may recall the sentence and commitment, and resentence the
offender. A commitment and retention of jurisdiction under this
subsection shall be specified in the sentencing order. If that
specification is not included in the sentencing order, the offender
shall be committed in accordance with Subsection (a). [7]

(3) When an offender is committed to the department under
Subsection (l)(b), the department shall provide the court with reports
7

Subsection (l)(a) provides for a transfer of the offender between the State
Hospital and the prison without a resentencing option and, hence, is not applicable
to this case. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(a).
15

of the offender's mental health status every six months. Those reports
shall be prepared in accordance with the requirements of Section 7716a-203....
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b) & (3).
Defendant argues that the required reports from the State Hospital merely
evaluate his current mental condition and therefore essentially "determine[] the best
location for the convicted person to serve a sentence, not the length of that
sentence." Aplt. Br. at 10-11. Because the evaluation bears on location, he contends,
the statute's directive that the court "may recall the sentence and commitment, and
resentence the offender" necessarily requires that the court return to section 77-16a104(3), ignore the requirement of imposing a legal sentence, and reevaluate whether
to commit Defendant to prison, probation, or the State Hospital. See id. at 11. The
court here, he argues, exceeded the scope of the statute by reassessing his criminal
culpability and then increasing his maximum sentence. See id. at 11-12.
Defendant's interpretation is contrary to the plain language of both
sentencing statutes. The plain language of section 77-16a-202(l)(b) provides that if
the trial court includes a retention of jurisdiction in its sentencing order, the
sentencing court "may recall the sentence and commitment, and resentence the
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offender/

Id. Section 77-16a-202(l)(b) does not provide for recall of just the

commitment or just the sentence, but both "the sentence and commitment^]" Id.
(emphasis added). "Recall" is defined as "revoke, cancel, vacate, or reverse[.]"
Black's Law Dictionary, 1139 (5th ed. 1979). In other words, the original judgment or
verdict of guilt remains in full force, but both the "sentence and commitment" are
effectively recalled and are no longer in effect.
The statute then directs that the court "resentence" Defendant, without
exception or restriction. Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b). Sentencing—and hence
resentencing—under section 77-16a-104(3) still includes two parts, not one as
Defendant suggests: (1) imposition of a legal sentence, "and" (2) a specific
commitment of the accused to prison, probation, or the State Hospital. Utah Code
Ann. § 77-16a-104(3). Consequently, with the benefit of the information now
available through the observations and reports from the State Hospital regarding
the accused's post-sentencing stay, including "an estimation of the offender's
dangerousness... to himself or others [,]" the sentencing judge is to "resentence" the
offender: i.e., impose both a legal sentence and a specific commitment to fill the
void left by the recall. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-16a~104(3), -202(l)(b), and -203(3)(b).
8

Defendant does not, and cannot, contend that the trial court failed to include
in the original sentencing order a retention of jurisdiction under section 77-16a202(l)(b). See Add. D. Neither does he argue that the court failed in any way to
comply with the requirements of section 77-16a-104.
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Hence, the court is again required to "impose any sentence that could be imposed
under law upon a defendant who is not mentally ill and who is convicted of the
same offense/' and to commit the accused to prison or to probation or to recommit
him to the State Hospital. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104(3). In addition, the
court must necessarily make "'the determination of whether . . . simultaneously
imposed sentences are to be served concurrently or consecutively" inasmuch as that
determination "is to be made at the time of sentencing[.]'" State v. Anderson, 2009
UT13, \ 11,203 P.3d 990 (quoting State v. Jaramillo, 2007 UT App 32, % 16,156 P.3d
839).
A Reasonable Result. This plain language interpretation of section 77-16a202(l)(b) leads to a rational result. The fact that section 77-16a-202(l)(b) recalls both
the sentence and the commitment, coupled with the fact that resentencing under
section 77-16a-104(3) provides for imposition of both a legal sentence and a specific
commitment, ensures the greatest flexibility in sentencing. It is reasonable that the
Legislature would give sentencing courts flexibility to change a sentence in the
context of guilty and mentally ill offenders to ensure a sentence is tailored to the
needs of mentally ill offenders. Indeed, Utah is unique in providing mentally ill
offenders the "inventive" alternative of being found guilty and mentally ill. See
State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 367-68 (Utah 1995); Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-102(2)
(West 2004). Utah's GAMI statutes represent a compassionate alternative by which
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convicted offenders, who were mentally ill at the time of their crime, receive special
hospitalization and treatment if they remain mentally ill at the time of sentencing.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104; see also State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372,1378 (Utah
1996) (characterizing "the GAMI verdict [a]s an improved and compassionate form
of punishment" for legally sane but mentally ill offenders who would otherwise be
entitled to no special sentencing); see also Herrera, 895 P.2d at 367-68 ("[TJhe mens
rea model coupled with this inventive verdict [GAMI] is a constitutionally valid
system of dealing with an ever-adapting field . . [and] a legitimate approach to
dealing with the sometimes baffling relationship between insanity and mens rea/').
The sentencing court needs flexibility to most accurately meet the needs of GAMI
defendants at sentencing because the effectiveness of the mental health treatment
provided under section 77-16a-202(l)(b) cannot be predicted. The plain language
used by the Legislature ensures the best possible fit of both mental health treatment
and punishment by providing an opportunity for a GAMI defendant to obtain
adequate mental health treatment and to thereafter receive the most appropriate
sentence to suit both his offense as well as his mental health status.
Further, information relevant to sentencing concerning an offender's
correctional and supervisory needs may come to light during the offender's time at
the State Hospital, as occurred here. The Legislature allows the district court to
tailor a sentence and commitment to the individual GAMI defendant's mental
19

condition by providing this opportunity for additional information.

Such

information may, but need not always, justify a sentencing change and may result in
a sentencing reduction as readily as a sentencing increase.

In any event,

resentencing pursuant to the plain language of section 77-16a-202(l)(b) best permits
the sentencing court to ensure the most appropriate length and form of punishment
for this unique subset of offenders.
Finally, this interpretation takes into account each term used by the
Legislature, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of those terms. In contrast,
Defendant's interpretation does not account for the "recall [of] the sentence and
commitment/' and provides only for a partial resentencing. Utah Code Ann. § 7716a-202(l)(b) (emphasis added); Aplt. Br. at 9-12. Had the Legislature intended to
permit the court to alter only the location of the commitment, it could easily have
allowed for recall of the commitment alone and omitted any reference to recall of
"the sentence^]" Moreover, under Defendant's interpretation, the sentencing court
is not free to change the sentence at all, with the result that should the court deem a
reduction from consecutive to concurrent sentencing to be appropriate following a
temporary commitment to the State Hospital, it would be unable to so tailor the
sentence to fit the situation. See Aplt. Br. at 6,11. Nothing in the plain language of
the statute suggests that the Legislature intended to bind the hands of the
sentencing court so thoroughly.
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This Case. Judge Anderson did exactly what the statute 's plain language
permits: "resentence[d] the offender" by "impos[ing] any sentence that could be
imposed under law" on a convicted offender who was not mentally ill. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 77-16a-104(3) and -202(l)(b). The first sentence was imposed after
entry of a guilty plea and presentation of testimony from Dr. Robert Howell
recommending commitment to the State Hospital under section 77-16a-202(l)(b) to
regulate Defendant's medication.

R. 5-6.

The resentencing involved a full

sentencing hearing, ensuring that the sentencing determination was based on all
available relevant information. Indeed, nothing in the plain language of the GAMI
sentencing statutes restricts the scope of the sentencing factors or information to be
considered on resentencing. Judge Anderson obtained and reviewed the hospital's
report, acquired and considered for the first time a presentence investigation report,
and heard statements from Defendant's counsel, father, and brother. R. 2,44. Only
then did the judge find:
That Def[endant]'s past records indicate serious problems and that
[the] reports indicate Defendant] does pose [a] serious threat of violent
behavior and criminal conduct. Def [endantj's attitude is not conducive
to supervision. Because of the threat to society, the court must
reimpose [the] sentences previously imposed.
R. 2,44. In other words, the judge considered all the relevant information available
to him—including "the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant" — and determined from that information that a heightened concern for
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societal protection existed.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (outlining the

information "the court shall" consider when determining whether sentences are to
run concurrently or consecutively); State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App.
1993) (an accused may be sentenced for purposes other than rehabilitation,
including the protection of society) (citing State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 265, 268
(Utah 1986)). It is up to the Board of Pardons and Defendant, through his own
actions in prison, whether or not he will remain incarcerated for the aggregate
maximum term of his sentence. See Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 947 P.2d 664, 669
(Utah 1997) (the Board has the authority to determine the actual number of years
served in Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme).
The Statutes do not Prohibit the Instant Change. Defendant ultimately
contends that, as a matter of policy, the GAMI sentencing statutes should be
interpreted as preventing an increase in the maximum term imposed in the original
sentence. See Aplt. Br. at 20-21. He relies on Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1994)) to
support his argument. See id. That statute prohibits increasing a sentence following
reversal of a conviction or sentence on appeal:
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct
review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new
sentence for the same offense or for a different offense based on the
same conduct which is more severe than the prior sentence less the
portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405(1). That statute, he claims, is aimed at encouraging
defendants to freely exercise their right to appellate review without the fear of
receiving an increased punishment on retrial after a successful appeal. See Aplt. Br.
at 20 (citing State v. Samora, 2004 UT 79, If 15, 99 P.3d 858). He contends that a
similar rationale should apply here to prevent an increase in his maximum sentence
on resentencing under the GAMI scheme. See Aplt. Br. at 20-21. He reasons that a
similar prohibition on increasing a GAMI sentence would encourage mentally ill
defendants to be more forthcoming with hospital personnel and to more freely vent
their aggressive or difficult behavior at the State Hospital without fear that their
conduct could adversely affect their sentence. See id.
Clearly, Defendant's proposed limitation does not serve the same policy
concern as section 76-3-405. In fact, to the extent a GAMI defendant is able to
control his violent urges and present himself favorably to hospital personnel, the
statute provides an incentive to do so by allowing for a reduction in sentence or the
possibility of probation following his temporary stay at the hospital.

But if

Defendant's interpretation holds, that incentive would be removed because, as
explained, a sentencing court would be prohibited from reducing a GAMI
defendant's sentence, even though circumstances might warrant it.
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Additionally, the sentencing restriction after a reversal in section 76-3-405
contains an exception which explains why a similar cap is both unnecessary and
undesirable under the GAMI statutes:
(2) This section does not apply when:
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which were not known
to the court at the time of the original sentence, and the court
affirmatively places on the record the facts which provide the basis
for the increased sentence^]
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405(2). That is the precise situation which arises upon
commitment to the State Hospital under section 77-16a-202(l)(b). The State Hospital
is required to periodically evaluate the accused's mental condition and provide
periodic reports and recommendations to the court. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-16a202(3) and -203. On resentencing, any alteration to the sentence —either up or
down—incorporates the information provided by the State Hospital and likely
unavailable at the time of the original sentence. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a202(l)(b).
Here, the sentencing court stated that the hospital's reports were given "great
weight" in the resentencing determination. R. 2,43-44. The temporary commitment
of any defendant to the State Hospital under the GAMI statutes—which necessarily
contemplates the acquisition and use of information that was "not known to the
court at the time of the original sentence" — is precisely the type of situation the
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Legislature has recognized is not amenable to a limitation on the maximum term of
the original sentence. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405(2)(a). That the Legislature
intended no such limitation in GAMI sentencing is further demonstrated by the fact
that the GAMI statute does not contain any restriction on the court's ability to
"recall the sentence and commitment and resentence the offender/' aside from the
need to reserve jurisdiction to do so. Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b).
Finally, had the Legislature intended to prohibit a change in the maximum
term of imprisonment on resentencing under the GAMI statutes, it could readily
have done so by following its own example from section 76-3-405. It did not. That
omission speaks volumes as to the meaning of the language the Legislature chose to
include in the GAMI sentencing statutes.
Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and where the
ordinary meaning of the statute's plain language permits the sentencing court to
increase the sentence under circumstances present in this case, the statute allows the
trial court's action in this case.
B. Defendant's Assertion that the Plain Language of the
Sentencing Statutes Carries the Potential for State and Federal
Constitutional Violations was not Preserved for Review
Defendant contends that interpreting the sentencing statutes to permit an
increase in his sentence would violate the Sixth Amendment to the federal
constitution as well as his right to a jury trial under the Utah Constitution. See Aplt.
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Br. at 12-14. He admits that he did not previously present these claims for appellate
review, but argues that they warrant consideration by this Court because they
demonstrate a "future" constitutional concern in the event his sentencing
interpretation is rejected by yet another court. Id. at 13.
Because the arguments were not presented to the court of appeals and did not
arise for the first time from that court's decision, they are not properly before this
Court. See Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, f 19 n.3,52 P.3d 1267
(refusing to reach an issue not raised before the court of appeals where it did "not
arise solely out of the court of appeals' decision") (quoting DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d
428,444 (Utah 1995)); Maguire, 957 P.2d at 600 (refusing to reach on certiorari review
a double jeopardy issue not addressed by the court of appeals). Neither were the
arguments included in Defendant's request for certiorari review or "fairly included
therein[.]" Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4) ("Only the questions set forth in the petition or
fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme Court."). Defendant cites
no authority supporting the presentation of these claims for the first time on
certiorari review, provides no reason for his failure to timely raise the claims before
now, and offers no principled reason to ignore the preservation rule. See Aplt. Br. at
12-14. If there is any "constitutional concern]] in the future[,]" it may be addressed
in due course in a case in which the matter is timely presented in an appropriate
manner so as to permit full and fair consideration of the claims. Id. at 13.
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II.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY IS NOT IMPLICATED BECAUSE
DEFENDANT HAD NO LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF
FINALITY IN HIS ORIGINAL SENTENCE
Defendant contends that the increase in his maximum sentence violates the
double jeopardy clauses of the state and federal constitutions. See Aplt. Br. at 14-21.
Defendant does not argue that the state constitution provides any more or less
protection than the federal constitution. Hence, the State presents only a federal
constitutional analysis herein. See State v. Cahoon, 2007 UT App 269, f 8, n.l, 167
P.3d 533 (conducting only a federal constitutional review absent presentation of a
basis for an independent state constitutional review), rev'd on other grounds, State v.
Cahoon, 2009 UT 9,203 P.3d 957. He argues first that his original sentence was final
for double jeopardy purposes when it was signed and entered by the trial court,
when he commenced his sentence in the State Hospital, or when the time for filing
an appeal expired. See id. at 14-17. He then contends that he had a legitimate
expectation of finality in the first sentence. See id. at 17-19. Finally, he asserts that
because jeopardy attached, the lower court was prohibited from increasing his
sentence on resentencing. See id. at 20-21. Defendant's arguments are contrary to
established law.
The Law. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides:
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb . . . . "
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U.S. Const, amend. V. The clause "'embodies three separate protections: (1)
protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2)
protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and
(3) protection against multiple punishments for the same offense/"

State v.

Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, If 36,218 P.3d 610 (quoting Bernat v. Allphin, 2005 UT 1,111,
106 P.3d 707); see also State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Eight Hundred
Dollars, 942 P.2d 343, 349 (Utah 1997); Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, | 7. Defendant's
challenge purports to implicate the third protection.
But '"[sentencing procedures traditionally receive less double jeopardy
protection than do prosecutions/ ... and resentencing per se does not implicate the
double jeopardy protection from multiple punishments." Maguire, 1999 UT App 45,
f 11 (citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139, 101 S. Ct. 426 (1980))
(additional citation omitted). The lynchpin of the double jeopardy inquiry in this
context is the existence of a legitimate expectation of finality in the original sentence.
See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136-37 (the Double Jeopardy Clause protects the finality
of criminal judgments and prohibits alterations to sentences carrying a legitimate
expectation of finality); Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ^f 36 ("'[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause
only proscribes resentencing where the defendant has developed a legitimate
expectation of finality in his original sentence.'") (quoting Maguire, 1999 UT App 45,
f 8) (additional quotation omitted); see also United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 87
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(D.C. Cir. 1987) ("If a defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, then an
increase in [his] sentence is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause. If, however,
there is some circumstance which undermines the legitimacy of that expectation,
then a court may permissibly increase the sentence.").

Absent a legitimate

expectation of finality in a sentence, double jeopardy does not bar the imposition of
an increased sentence. See Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, *| 39 (absent legitimate expectation
of finality in sentence not accurately reflecting plea agreement, subsequent increase
in restitution arising from correction of error did not violate double jeopardy
protections); Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, ^% 8-12 (defendant who voluntarily
withdrew guilty plea had no legitimate expectation of finality in original
proceedings, and subsequent increase in sentence did not violate Double Jeopardy
Clause); see also DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 139 (absent legitimate expectation of finality
in original sentence, commencement of sentence did not prevent subsequent
increase in sentence pursuant to statute); United States v. Rourke, 984 F.2d 1063,1066
(10th Cir. 1992) ("When a second sentence imposed on resentencing is more severe
than the original sentence, the relevant double jeopardy analysis requires that we
ask whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of finality in his original
sentence [;]" if not, the increase in sentence did not implicate double jeopardy
concerns); see also Romero v. People, 179 P.3d 984, 989-90 (Colo. 2007) ("[D]ouble
jeopardy does not bar the imposition of an increased sentence if the defendant
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lacked a legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence/'); People v. Adams, 128
P.3d 260,261 (Colo. App. 2005) ("punishment for a criminal offense can be increased
without violating the double jeopardy protections . . . when a defendant has no
legitimate expectation of finality in his or her sentence"), cert denied (Feb. 21,2006);
Sentence Review Panel et al v. Moseley, 663 S.E.2d 679, 683-84 (Ga. 2008) (where
statute provided for modification of sentence after imposition, sentence was not
final, no expectation of finality arose, and double jeopardy did not preclude
subsequent increase in sentence); State v. Gefroh, 458 N.W.2d 479, 483 (N.D. 1990)
(absent legitimate expectation in finality of sentence, subsequent imposition of
harsher sentence not prohibited by double jeopardy).
In addition, where a sentence is, by statute, subject to further review and
revision, generally no legitimate expectation of finality arises in the original
sentence during the review period contemplated by the statute. See Romero, 179 P.3d
at 990 ("Because the legislature provided for the possibility of a sentence increase
under Romero's circumstances, Romero lacked a legitimate expectation of finality in
his sentence/'); People v. Castellano, 209 P.3d 1208,1209-10 (Colo. App.) (defendant
had no legitimate expectation of finality in original sentence subject to further
review and possible alteration under criminal rules and statute which provided that,
upon probation revocation, court could impose "any sentence . . . which might
originally have been imposed . .."), cert, denied (Colo. June 29, 2009); Moseley, 663
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S.E.2d at 683-84 ("when 'the legislature has provided that a sentence, once imposed,
is subject to appeal and/or subsequent modification, [the sentence] . . . is not
considered final or absolute/" and no reasonable expectation in its finality arises)
(quoting Wilford v. State, 278 Ga. 718,720,606 S.E.2d 252 (2004)); Gefroh, 458 N.W.2d
at 482-83 (where defendant had statutory notice of possibility of more severe
sentence upon revocation of probation, his resentencing to a greater sentence after
revocation of probation was not violation of Double Jeopardy Clause because he
had no legitimate expectation of finality in original sentence).
Analysis, The determinative question, therefore, is whether Defendant had
any legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence. See Aplt. Br. at 17
(acknowledging that "an illegitimate expectation of finality does not trigger double
jeopardy protections"). The answer is no.
The Legislature expressly provided for recalling the original "sentence and
commitment" and for resentencing an offender under the circumstances present
here. The Legislature did so without limitation on the permissible sentencing
changes. See Point I, supra; Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b). In compliance with
the statute, Judge Anderson's initial sentencing order expressly provided that the
Defendant would ultimately "be brought before th[e] Court for reconsideration in
his sentence," and that the court "retain[ed] jurisdiction in this matter to alter or
amend its [sentencing] order." R. 4,46. Defendant was charged with knowledge of
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the statute and its provisions and could have had no expectation of finality in his
sentence until the resentencing occurred and the sentence was no longer subject to
modification under the statute. See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136-39 (defendant is
charged with knowledge of statute permitting government to appeal sentence and
can have no expectation of finality in sentence until appeal is concluded or time for
appeal has expired). Defendant was also on actual notice that the original sentence
was not final and was subject to being recalled and revised based on the trial court's
sentencing order. Hence, he lacked a legitimate expectation of finality in his original
sentence, and the resentencing did not violate his double jeopardy rights. See
Adams, 128 P.3d at 262 (where statute provided for resentencing to "any sentence...
which might originally have been imposed[,]" there was no legitimate expectation
of finality in original sentences and lower court was free to change concurrent
sentences to consecutive without violating Double Jeopardy Clause) (quotation
omitted).
Defendant contends that even if the statute provided authority for an
increase in his sentence, he maintained 3 legitimate expectation in the finality of that
sentence because jeopardy had attached. See Aplt. Br. at 14-17. He argues that "the
original sentence was final for purposes of double jeopardy" because: (1) it became
final for purposes of appeal upon entry of a written order; (2) neither party appealed
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from the original order; and (3) he commenced service of the original sentence by
his initial confinement in the State Hospital. Id.
It is not simply a question, however, of whether jeopardy attached or a
sentence is final for purposes of appeal, but of whether and when Defendant can
reasonably expect finality in the sentence. See, e.g., DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 128-29,
132-39 (recognizing that jeopardy attaches before a judgment becomes final and
rejecting position that pronouncement of criminal sentence carries constitutional
finality and conclusiveness so as to prohibit legislative provision for subsequent
review of sentence); Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, | | 8-9 (defendant acquired no
expectation of finality in original sentence where, after completion of original
sentence, he sought and received leave to withdraw his plea). Moreover, the United
States Supreme Court has held that the pronouncement of a sentence does not carry
such a degree of constitutional finality that subsequent statutory review or
modification of the sentence is precluded by double jeopardy. See DiFrancesco, 449
U.S. at 132-39. When review or modification is permitted by statute, a sentence is
not considered final for double jeopardy purposes and no expectation of finality can
arise. See id. at 135-41 (no legitimate expectation of finality upon imposition of
sentence in view of statutory right to appeal); Moseley, 663 S.E.2d at 683-84 (sentence
subject to appeal or modification not final or absolute for purposes of double
jeopardy). Consequently, despite a defendant's subjective belief that a sentence has
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been finally determined and that further modification is prohibited, no legitimate
expectation of finality arises if a statute specifically provides for further review or
modification. See, e.g., DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 138-39 (rejecting claim that length of
sentence is set upon commencement of sentence where law permits further review
or modification of sentence).
Here, none of the options suggested by Defendant triggered double jeopardy
protections because they were not coupled with a legitimate expectation of finality
in the original sentence. Here, each of the options necessarily occurred before the
resentencing allowed under the GAMI statutes. Hence, the sentence remained
subject to review and modification.

The United States Supreme Court has

determined that commencement of a sentence provides no legitimate expectation of
finality in the face of a legislative declaration providing for modification. See
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136-39. Moreover, where the original sentencing order is
necessarily entered before commencement of the sentence, its entry can offer no
more of a legitimate expectation of finality.

Further, where the narrowly-drawn

statute and the sentencing order itself alerted Defendant to the fact that the original
sentence was not final, the expiration of the time for appealing that sentence cannot
provide a legitimate expectation of finality when it occurs before the resentencing
contemplated by the challenged statute. See also DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136-37 (no
expectation of finality in sentence could arise until after "the finite period provided
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by the statute" detailing a potential sentencing increase for dangerous special
offenders; and expressly rejecting claim that commencement of sentence before
statute's finite period triggers expectation of finality). Because the original sentence
remained subject to the statutory resentencing provisions from the time of its
inception, no legitimate expectation of finality arose before resentencing. See, e.g.,
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 138-39 (observing there can be no expectation of finality in
original sentence when accused begins to serve it where statute specifically provides
for additional sentence review); Castellano, 209 P.3d at 1209-10 ("'double jeopardy
does not bar the imposition of an increased sentence if the defendant lacked a
legitimate expectation of finality in the [original] sentence.'") (quoting Romero, 179
P.3d at 989 and citing DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 139); Adams, 128 P.3d at 261-62 (no
legitimate expectation of finality in original sentence where resentencing provided
for as matter of law).
Defendant contends that he necessarily had a legitimate expectation of finality
in the original sentence because of the absence of three specific situations which
would ordinarily defeat any legitimate expectation: (1) the original sentence was
not illegal; (2) he did not voluntarily challenge the original sentence; and (3) the
original sentence did not "undermine[] the objectives of the criminal statute." See
Aplt. Br. at 17-19. The absence of these circumstances, however, cannot render
legitimate an expectation of finality which, as argued, supra, never arose. Moreover,
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it was the express language of section 77-16a-202(l)(b), not the presence or absence
of Defendant's circumstances, that prevented Defendant from possessing any
legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence.
Defendant suggests that permitting the GAMI sentencing statutes to
temporarily suspend his double jeopardy rights is a step toward permitting the
Legislature to "nullify" double jeopardy protections entirely with a sweeping
statutory directive that all sentences are subject to revision at any time. Aplt Br. at
19. Where he did not have a legitimate expectation of finality in the original
sentence, his double jeopardy rights were not suspended because they never arose.
Moreover, his position ignores the judicial check on legislative enactments. Further,
the well-defined resentencing directive at issue is anything but an open-ended
nullification of double jeopardy rights. The resentencing provision of section 7716a-202(l)(b) specifically pertains to a narrow class of GAMI defendants identified
by the trial court as needing interim treatment to better assess and implement the
offender's mental health and sentencing needs. It applies over the course of a short,
defined period of time commencing immediately after imposition of the original
sentence. It accrues to the benefit of the GAMI offenders, providing the judge an
opportunity to "stabilize^" the psychological condition of a small subset of
offenders and to "ensure adequate mental health treatment" for the offenders so as
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to permit the ultimate imposition of the best sentencing determination possible for
each offender. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b) (West 2004).
Finally, Defendant claims a legitimate expectation of finality in the maximum
term of his original sentence based on a case from the Second Circuit. See Aplt. Br.
at 20 (citing Stewart v. Scully, 925 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1991)). Aside from the fact that he
has not established the existence of a legitimate expectation of finality, his reliance
on Stewart is misplaced.
Stewart represents an exception to normal double jeopardy analysis which
lacks application to this case. Stewart pled guilty to attempted murder and was
sentenced to an indeterminate term of ten to twenty years. Stewart, 925 F.2d at 59.
While serving his sentence, he discovered that the sentence was illegal because it
did not apply to the specific offense of attempted murder to which he had pled
guilty. See id. He moved to set aside the sentence and was ultimately resentenced to
a term of eight to twenty-four years.

See id. at 60. Stewart challenged the

resentencing, and the Second Circuit Court ultimately ruled that the increase in
Stewart's maximum term disturbed his legitimate expectation in the finality of his
sentence, thus violating the protection against multiple punishments guaranteed by
the double jeopardy clause. See id. at 60-65. The court acknowledged that it was
departing from DiFrancesco and the United States Supreme Court's direction that
there is no legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence which can, by statute, be
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increased. See Stewart, 925 F.2d at 63-64 (providing examples of past decisions). The
court explained that it was the particular circumstances of the case before it that
prompted a departure from prior decisions and a determination that Stewart had an
expectation of finality as to the maximum term of his original sentence. See id.
Those circumstances included: the specific terms of Stewart's plea agreement, the
trial court's express representations to Stewart at the change of plea hearing
concerning the potential maximum sentencing terms, and the fact that Stewart had
already served "a substantial part" of his sentence—three years—before discovering
the illegality in the original sentence that required his resentencing. See id. at 61,6465. Thus, Stewart was based on the totality of the facts which supported the
conclusion that Stewart had a reasonable and legitimate expectation of finality in his
sentence. No such facts exist here. Stewart, therefore, does not help Defendant.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted November JU, 2010.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
/

Utah Attorney General

-^-—-—ZS^fsr'....
'KRIS C. LEONARD ^

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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J
State of Utah,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 20090839-SC

v.
Lemuel Prion,
Defendant and Petitioner.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on October 6, 2009.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issue.
Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the denial
of Petitioner's rule 22(e) challenge to his re-sentencing.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter.

For The Court:

Dated

~20

l(y
Matthew B. Durrant
Associate Chief Justice

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January 21, 2010, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the
United States mail or placed in the Interdepartmental mail
service, or hand delivered to the parties listed below:
LEMUEL PRION 2 3 738
PO BOX 250
DRAPER UT 84020-0250
KRIS C LEONARD
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL BX 0854
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
LISA COLLINS
COURT OF APPEALS
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 140230
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230
EIGHTH DISTRICT, VERNAL DEPT
ATTN: CANDACE / DAWN
92 0 E HWY 4 0
VERNAL UT 84 07 8
Dated this January 21, 2010.

/*^___^"

Judicial Assistant

r^

-f—r

()

Utah Supreme Court Case No. 20090S39
EIGHTH DISTRICT, VERNAL DEPT Case No. 931800470
Court of Appeals Case No. J0090380

Addendum B

Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104 (Supp. 1994):
Verdict of guilty and mentally ill - Hearing to determine
present mental state.
(1) Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill for the offense charged, or any
lesser offense, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine the defendant's
present mental state.
(2) The court may order the department to examine the defendant to
determine his mental condition, and may receive the evidence of any public or
private expert witness offered by the defendant or the prosecutor. The
defendant may be placed in the Utah State Hospital for that examination only
upon approval of the executive director.
(3) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is
currently mentally ill, it shall impose any sentence that could be imposed
under law upon a defendant who is not mentally ill and who is convicted of the
same offense, and:
(a) commit him to the department, in accordance with the provisions of
Section 77-16a-202, if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(i) because of his mental illness the defendant poses an immediate
physical danger to self or others, including jeopardizing his own or
others' safety, health, or welfare if placed in a correctional or probation
setting, or lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities of life, such
as food, clothing, and shelter, if placed on probation; and
(ii) the department is able to provide the defendant with treatment,
care, custody, and security that is adequate and appropriate to the
defendant's conditions and needs. In order to insure that the requirements of this subsection are met, the court shall notify the executive
director of the proposed placement and provide the department with
an opportunity to evaluate the defendant and make a recommendation to the court regarding placement prior to commitment;
(b) order probation in accordance with Section 77-16a-201; or
(c) if the requirements of Subsections (a) and (b) are not met, place the
defendant in the custody of UDC.
(4) If the court finds that the defendant is not currently mentally ill, it shall
sentence the defendant as it would any other defendant.
(5) Expenses for examinations ordered under this section shall be paid in
accordance with Subsection 76-16a-103(5).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202 (1999):
Commitment to department.
(1) In sentencing and committing a mentally ill offender to the department
under Subsection 77-16a-104(3)(a), the court shall:
(a) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he
be committed to the department for care and treatment until transferred
to UDC in accordance with Sections 77-16a-203 and 77-16a-204; or
(b) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he
be committed to the department for care and treatment for no more than
18 months, or until he has reached maximum benefit, whichever occurs
first. At the expiration of that time, the court may recall the sentence and
commitment, and resentence the offender. A commitment and retention of
jurisdiction under this subsection shall be specified in the sentencing
order. If that specification is not included in the sentencing order, the
offender shall be committed in accordance with Subsection (a).
(2) The court may not retain jurisdiction, under Subsection (l)(b), over the
sentence of a mentally ill offender who has been convicted of a capital offense.
In capital cases, the court shall make the findings required by this section after
the capital sentencing proceeding mandated by Section 76-3-207.
(3) When an offender is committed to the department under Subsection
(1Kb), the department shall provide the court with reports of the offender's
mental health status every six months. Those reports shall be prepared in
accordance with the requirements of Section 77-16a-203. Additionally, the
court may appoint an independent examiner to assess the mental health status
of the offender.
(4) The period of commitment may not exceed the maximum sentence
imposed by the court. Upon expiration of that sentence, the administrator of
the facility where the offender is located may initiate civil proceedings for
involuntary commitment in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 12 or Title
62A, Chapter 5.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203 (1999):
Review of guilty and mentally ill persons committed to
department - Recommendations for transfer.
(1) The executive director shall designate a review team of at least three
qualified staff members, including at least one licensed psychiatrist, to
evaluate the mental condition of each mentally ill offender committed to it in
accordance with Section 77-16a-202, at least once every six months. If the
offender is mentally retarded, the review team shall include at least one
individual who is a designated mental retardation professional, as defined in
Section 62A-5-301.
(2) At the conclusion of its evaluation, the review team described in
Subsection (1) shall make a report to the executive director regarding the
offender's current mental condition, his progress since commitment, prognosis,
and a recommendation regarding whether the mentally ill offender should be
transferred to UDC or remain in the custody of the department.
(3) (a) The executive director shall notify the UDC medical administrator,
and the board's mental health adviser that a mentally ill offender is
eligible for transfer to UDC if the review team finds that the offender:
(i) is no longer mentally ill; or
(ii) is still mentally ill and continues to be a danger to himself or
others, but can be controlled if adequate care, medication, and
treatment are provided, and that he has reached maximum benefit
from the programs within the department.
(b) The administrator of the mental health facility where the offender is
located shall provide the UDC medical administrator with a copy of the
reviewing staffs recommendation and:
(i) all available clinical facts;
(ii) the diagnosis;
(iii) the course of treatment received at the mental health facility;
(iv) the prognosis for remission of symptoms;
(v) the potential for recidivism;
(vi) an estimation of the offender's dangerousness, either to himself
or others; and
(vii) recommendations for future treatment.

Addendum C

NUMBER 931800470 State Felony
FOR
-94 Note: ENTERING THE PLEA TODAY IS NOT PREPARED. THE COURT
CONTINUES
-94 Note: THIS MATTER TO JULY 22, 1994 AT 10:00 A.M.
-94 Note: Notice of Setting
-94 HEARING ON STATUS scheduled on July 22, 1994 at 10:00 AM in
ROOM 2 with Judge ANDERSON.
-94 Note: Hearing (HEARING ON STATUS):
JUDGE: JOHN R.
ANDERSON
-94 Note:
TAPE: V-1037
COUNT:
0597
-94 Note:
ATD: WILLIAMS, ALAN M.
ATP: URESK, ROLAND
-94 Note:
Deft Present
-94 Note: COUNSEL FOR DEF INDICATED DEF WOULD LIKE TO ENTER PLEA OF
GUILTY
1-94 Note: AND MENTALLY ILL. COUNSEL INDICATED HRG. WOULD NEED TO BE
SET.
!-94 Note: COURT SETS HRG. FOR AUG. 19, 1994, AT 1:30 P.M. FOR
TAKING OF
1-94 Note: PLEA, AND IF PARTIES DO NOT STIPULATE, COUNTY ATTORNEY
WOULD
>-94 Note: NEED TO SUBPOENA DOCTORS TO BE HERE TO HAVE EVIDENTIARY
HRG. TO
> . 94 Note
ENABLE COURT TO MAKE FINDINGS.
Notice
of Setting
2-94 Note
FILED
RETURN OF SERVICE ON SUBPOENA (ROBERT J HOWELL)
L-94 Note
3-94 Note FILED AMENDED SUBPOENA (DR. ROBERT HOWELL)
SUBPOENA (DR. ROBERT J. HOWELL) WITH ACCEPTANCE
3-94 Note FILED
OF
9-94 Note: SERVICE
9-94 HEARING DEFAULT scheduled on August 24, 1994 at 02:30 PM in
ROOM 2 with Judge ANDERSON.
1-94 Note: Hearing:
JUDGE: JOHN R.
ANDERSON
1-94 Note:
ATD: WILLIAMS, ALAN M.
ATP: WALLENTINE,
KENNETH
1-94 Note:
Deft Present
1-94 Note: DR. ROBERT HOWE WAS SWORN AND TESTIFIED. DR. HOWE
TESTIFIED DEF
4-94 Note: IS MENTALLY ILL, BUT IS RESPONDING TO MEDICATION. HE ALSO
4-94 Note: INDICATED DEF DOES NOT MEET CRITERIA TO BE SENT TO STATE
4-94 Note: HOSPITAL, BUT COURT COULD SEND DEF TO STATE HOSPITAL IN
ORDER TO
4-94 Note: REGULATE MEDICATION WITH COURT STILL MAINTAINING
JURISDICTION.
4-94 Note: COUNSEL FOR PLA MAKES MOTION BASED ON TESTIMONY GIVEN TO
ENTER
4-94 Note: INTO PLEA AGREEMENT. COUNSEL FOR DEF INDICATED PLEA
AGREEMENT
4-94 Note: HAD BEEN REACHED FOR DEF TO ENTER GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL

ted: 02/04/10 10:05:58
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NUMBER 931800470 State Felony

PLEAS
24-94 Note: TO DANGEROUS WEAPON, F2, IN CASE #941800068, AND TO AGG.
ASLT,
24-94 Note: F3, AND DEALER IN POSS. W/O AFFIXING TAX STAMP, F3, IN
THIS
24-94 Note: CASE. ALL OTHER CHARGES IN BOTH CASES WOULD BE DISMISSED.
COURT
24-94 Note: EXPLAINED RIGHTS TO DEF. DEF STATED HE UNDERSTOOD HIS
RIGHTS,
24-94 Note: WAIVED HIS RIGHTS. COUNSEL FOR DEF GAVE FACTUAL BASIS FOR
PLEA.
24-94 Note: COUNSEL FOR DEF, COUNSEL FOR PLA, AND DEF EXECUTED
AFFIDAVIT OF
24-94 Note: DEF IN ADVANCE OF GUILTY PLEA AND AGREEMENT. DEF ENTERED
PLEA OF
24-94 Note: GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL AS INDICATED IN ABOVE PLEA
AGREEMENT.
24-94 Note: COURT FINDS PLEA WAS MADE KNOWINGLY, AND COURT ACCEPTS
DEF'S
24-94 Note: PLEA OF GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL. BASED ON STATE'S MOTION,
COURT
24-94 Note: DISMISSES REMAINING CHARGES IN BOTH CASES.
24-94 Note:
Chrg: NO PAY DRUG TAX
Plea: Guilty
Find:
Guilty Plea
•24-94 Note:
0 05
YEARS
Suspended:
0
•24-94 Note: COURT FINDS BASED ON DOCTOR'S TESTIMONY ABOUT EFFECT OF
MEDICINE
-24-94 Note: IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO PLACE DEF WITH DEPT. OF
CORRECTIONS
•24-94 Note: RIGHT NOW. COURT FINDS DEF IS GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL,
HAVING
-24-94 Note: MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATE. COURT SENTENCES DEF TO
0- 5
24-94 Note: YEARS AT UTAH STATE PRISON FOR AGG. ASLT, F3, AND DEALER
IN
-24-94 Note: POSS. W/O AFFIXING TAX STAMP, F3. COURT ORDERS DEF
COMMITTED TO
-24-94 Note: THE CARE OF DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES FOR NO MORE THAN 18
MONTHS.
-24-94 Note: COURT ORDERS JURISDICTION BY THIS COURT BE SPECIFIC AND
WILL
-24-94 Note: REVIEW AND RESENTENCE DEF IN 18 MONTHS, OR SOONER. COURT
WILL
-24-94 Note RECEIVE REPORTS OF DEF'S PROGRESS.
DATED THIS
DAY OF AUGUST, 19 94.
-24-94 Note
BY
THE
COURT:
-24-94 Note
JOHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
-24-94 Note
Find: Dismissed
-24-94 Note Chrg: 58-37-8.01
Find: Dismissed
-24-94 Note Chrg: 76-8-309

inted: 02/04/10 10:05:58
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NUMBER

-94
>-94
>-94
»-94
»-94
,-94
)-94
)-94
>-94
.-94

931800470 State

Felony

Find: Dismissed
Note: Chrg: 58-3 7ANote: Sentence:
Plea: Guilty
Find:
Note:
Chrg: AGG ASLT
Guilty Plea
Note:
005
YEARS
Suspended:
0
Note Other Agency control stay began 08/24/94
Note Other Agency control stay ended 02/15/96
Note COPY OF JUDGMENT SENT TO DEF AT UINTAH COUNTY JAIL
Note FILED: AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT IN ADVANCE OF GUILTY PLEA
AND
Note AGREEMENT AND ORDER SIGNED 8-24-94)
Note FILED: ORDER (JRA'S STAMP USED WITH HIS PERMISSION ON
9/1/94)
Note: Entered case disposition of: Closed
Note: FILED: ORDER TO TRANSPORT PRISONER (SIGNED 1-9 95)
Note: FILED: REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATION FROM GMI

'-94
)-95
.-95
S-95 Note: Notice of Setting
.-95 Sentencing scheduled on January 31, 1995 at 10:01 AM
.-95
.-95
.-95
.- 95
-95
.-95
.-95
.-95
.-95
.-95
.-95
-95
-9b
-95

-95
-95
-95

in ROOM 2

with Judge ANDERSON.
Note: Hearing (SENTENCING):
JUDGE: JOHN R.
ANDERSON
Note:
ATD: WILLIAMS, ALAN M.
ATP: STRINGHAM, JOANN
B.
Note:
Deft not present
Note: THIS
CAME BEFORE THE COURT FOR RESENTENCING, DEF.
IS
Note: NOT PRESENT BUT IS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
COUNSEL FOR
PLA.
Note: REQUESTS A CONTINUANCE AND RECOMMENDS DEF. BE SENT TO THE
UTAH
THE COURT REFERS THIS MATTER TO ADULT
Note: STATE PRISON.
PROBATION
Note: AND PAROLE FOR A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AS TO WHAT
PROGRAMS
Note: MIGHT BE AVAILABLE FOR DEF. A STATUS HEARING IS SET FOR
Note: MARCH 14, 1995 AT 10:00 A.M. TO SEE IF AP&P HAS COMPLETED
THE
Note: REPORT AND SENTENCE CAN BE PRONOUNCED.
HEARING ON STATUS scheduled on March 14, 1995 at 10:01 AM in
ROOM 2 with Judge ANDERSON.
Note. Hearing (HEARING ON STATUS
JUDGE: JOHN R.
ANDERSON
Note:
ATD: WILLIAMS, ALAN M.
ATP: WALLENTINE,
KENNETH R.
Note:
Deft Present
Note: THIS CASE WAS PREVIOUSLY SENTENCED UNDER GUILTY AND
MENTALLY ILL
Note: PLEA. AT THAT TIME, THE COURT REFERRED THIS MATTER TO
DEPT OF

0rOC:
' 3
.ed: 02/04/10 10:05:58
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5E NUMBER 931800470 State Felony

14-95 Note: HUMAN SERVICES, BUT RETAINED JURISDICTION. THEIR REPORT
HAS BEEN
14-95 Note: RECEIVED AND PSI RECEIVED. COUNSEL FOR DEF INDICATED
OBJECTIONS
14-95 Note: TO REPORTS. DEF'S FATHER AND BROTHER ADDRESSED THE COURT.
14-95 Note: COUNSEL FOR PLA STRONGLY DISAGREES WITH ANY PROBATION AND
FEELS
14-95 Note: GREAT WEIGHT MUST BE GIVEN TO PSI AND REPORTS RECEIVED.
THE
14-95 Note: COURT MAKES FINDINGS THAT DEF'S PAST RECORDS INDICATE
SERIOUS
-14-95 Note: PROBLEMS AND THAT REPORTS INDICATE DEF'S DOES POSE
SERIOUS
-14-95 Note: THREAT OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND CRIMINAL CONDUCT. DEF'S
ATTITUDE
-14-95 Note: IS NOT CONDUCIVE TO SUPERVISION. BECAUSE OF THE THREAT TO
-14-95 Note: SOCIETY, THE COURT MUST REIMPOSE SENTENCES PREVIOUSLY
IMPOSED.
-14-95 Note: Sentence:
-14-95 Note:
Chrg: AGG ASLT
Plea: Guilty
Find:
Guilty Plea
0 05
YEARS
Suspended:
0
14-95 Note
Entered Case Disposition of: Closed
14-95 Note
0 05
YEARS
Suspended:
0
14-95 Note
Entered Case Disposition of: Closed
-14-95 Note
Entered Case Disposition of: Closed
-14-95 Note
Entered Case Disposition of: Closed
-14-95 Note
-14-95 Note THE COURT SENTENCES DEF TO INDETERMINATE SENTENCE NOT TO
EXCEED
-14-95 Note: 5 YEARS IN UTAH STATE PRISON FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, F3,
AND
-14-95 Note: 0-5 YEARS FOR DEALER IN POSS. W/O AFFIXING TAX STAMP. DEF
IS
-14-95 Note: SENTENCED TO 1-15 YEARS IN CASE 941800068 ALSO. TPE COURT
ORDERS
-14-95 Note: SENTENCES TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY. DEF IS TO CONTINUE ON
MEDICATION
-14-95 Note: AND MEDICATION IS TO BE MONITORED. COURT WILL STAY
EXECUTION OF
-14-95 Note: SENTENCE UNTIL TUESDAY, MARCH 21, 1995, TO ENABLE DEF'S
MOTHER
-14-95 Note: TO VISIT DEF BEFORE HE IS REMANDED TO CUSTODY OF
DEPARTMENT OF
-14-95 Note CORRECTIONS.
DATED THIS
DAY OF MARCH, 1995
-14-95 Note
BY THE COURT:
-14-95 Note
JOHN R. ANDERSON
-14-95 Note
-14-95 Note
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
-13-04 Filed. Letter from Lemuel Prion
P r. r> ~

inted: 02/04/10 10:05:58
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Addendum D
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ROLAND URESK #3 3 07
Deputy Uintah County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
152 East: 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
(801) 781-5436

\J £ luQ/J

W£

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:"
Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

LEMUEL PRION,

:

ORDER

CASE NO.

9 3 18 00470 FS
941800068 FS

Defendant.
This matter came on before the Court upon a hearing this the
19th day of August, 1994, the Honorable John R. Anderson
presiding.

The State being represented by Roland Uresk, Deputy

Uintah County Attorney.

The Defendant being personally present

and represented by Alan M. Williams.
The Defendant having pled guilty and mentally ill to the
charges of (1) Dangerous Weapon in Correctional Facility, a
Second Degree Felony; (2) Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree
Felony; (3) Dealer in Possession without Affixing Tax Stamp, a
Third Degree Felony.
The Court, having heard comments from both parties makes the
following findings:

&.*

Thar the Defendant poses an immediate pfffsicalf

flTariger" to himself or others, including jeopardizing his

o*rn-or4

others' safety, health, or welfare if placed in a correctional o n
probation setting, or lacks the ability to provide the basic^
'necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter, if#
'placed on probation.*
2.

Thau until the Defendant's medication is regulated

he cannot be committed to the Department of Corrections.
Based upon the foregoing the Court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the Defendant is currently manually ill,
therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

That the Defendant is committed to the Department

of Corrections for the follov/ing sentences: fa) Dangerous Weapon
in Correctional Facility, a Second Degree Felony, not less than
one (1) nor more than fifteen (15) years; (b) Aggravated Assault,
a Third Degree Felony, not mere than five (5) years; (c) Dealer
in Possession witneut Affixing Tax Stamp, a Third Degree Felony,
not more than five (5) years.

Said sentences to run

concurrently.
2.

That the Defendant is committed to the Department

of Corrections for care and treatment for not more tnan eighteen
(18) months, or until he has reached maximum benefit whichever
2

occurs first.

Upon this determination the Defendant shall be

brought before this Court lor reconsideration in his sentence.
3.

That the Department of Corrections shall file a

progress report with the Court, the County Attorney and the
Defendant's Attorney every six (6) months without fail.
4.

This Court retains jurisdiction in this matter LO

alter or amend its order.
DATED this

1 -'

day of September, 1994.

/ ft

f\

U

JOHN -R. ANDERSON
District Court, Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING\HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, or hand delivered a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to Alan M. Williams, Attorney for Defendant, 365 West
50 North #W10, Vernal, Utah
Utah

84078; Uintah County Jail, Vernal,

84078.
DATED this ) ^ _ day of September, 1994,

r. n n u u u U<•*1 j
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KENNETH R. WALLENTINE #5817
Chief Deputy Uintah County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
152 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
(801) 781-5435
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
ORDER AND COMMITMENT
vs,
LEMUEL PRION,

CASE NO.

941800068 FS

Defendant.
THIS MATTER came before the Court for sentencing on the 14th
day of March, 1995.
Williams.

Defendant appeared with his attorney, Alan M.

The State was represented by Kenneth P. Wallentine,

Chief Deputy Uintah County Attorney.

Defendant having plead guilty

to the aforementioned charges, tne Court finds Defendant presents
a serious threat of violent behavior, with repetitive instances of
criminal conduct, and has an attitude not conducive to probation;
therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

That Defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison for

a term of not less than ONE (1) YEAR nor more than FIFTEEN
YEARS upon the offense

of Dangerous Weapon

Facility, a Second Degree Felony.

in a

(15)

Correctional

Said sentence to be served

consecutively with Case No. 941800470.

Defendant is remanded to

O \J \J 'y_, W -j.

the custody of the Uintah County Sheriff to be delivered by him to
the Warden of the Utah State Prison.
2.

It

is the

Court's recommendation

that

the

Defendant

continue on his prescribed medication.
DATED this

/<

dav of March

/ML
II
"^ - - A/CTOHN R. ANDERSON

District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify
delivered

a true copy

that I mailed, postage prepaid, or hand
of the foregoing

Judgment

and Order

of

Commitment to Alan M. Williams, Attorney for Defendant, 365 West 50
North #W10, Vernal, UT 84078; Department of Corrections, 152 East
100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078; Uintah County Jail, VernaL, Utah
84078.
DATED this

/C)

day of March, 1995.
>, .
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Addendum F

Westlaw.
Not Reported in P.3d
Not Reported in P.3d, 2007 WL 1366381 (Utah App.), 2007 UT App 163
(Cite as: 2007 WI 1366381 (Utah App.))

UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT
RLH.ES BEFORE CITING.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Lemuel PRION, Petitioner and Appellant.
v.

STATE of Utah, Respondent and Appellee.
No. 20070249-CA.
May 10,2007.
Eighth District, Vernal Department, 070800083;
The Honorable John R. Anderson.
Lemuel Prion, Draper, Appellant Pro Se.

Before Judges GREENWOOD, BILLINGS, and
DAVIS.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM:
*1 Lemuel Prion appeals the dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief. This case is before
the court on a sua sponte motion for summary disposition.
On August 29, 1994, Prion pleaded guilty to possession of a dangerous weapon in a correctional facility, aggravated assault, and dealer in possession
without affixing a tax stamp. Prion was sentenced
on these charges on September 1, 1994, and March
15, 1995. Prion did not file a motion for postconviction relief until February 12, 2007. The district
court dismissed Prion's petition on the grounds that
relief was precluded under Utah Code section
78-35a-107(l), which states, "[a] petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one
year after the cause of action has accrued."Utah

Page 1

Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(1) (Supp.2006). The district court noted that, for purposes of this section,
the cause of action accrues on "the date on which
petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on
which the petition is based."A£ § 78-35a-107(2)(e).
However, the district court ruled that "[tjhere is
nothing in the petition, other than [Prion's] bald assertion otherwise, indicating that [Prion] couldn't
have known about the facts underlying the petition
earlier.'Thus, the district court dismissed the petition on the basis that it was barred by the statute of
limitations.
Prion argues that the district court erred b\ considering his petition on the merits without holding an
evidentiary hearing. This assertion is contrary to
rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
SeeUtih R. Civ. P 65C. Specifically, rule
65C(g)(l) provides:
Die assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if
it is apparent to the court that any claim has been
adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim
in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the
court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the
claim, stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face.
The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner.
Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the
entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law.
Utah Rule Civ. P. 65C(g)(l).FN1 Thus, the district
court was not required to conduct a hearing and Prion has consequently failed to show that the district
court erred when it considered Prion's petition
without holding an evidentiary hearing.
FN1. We note that even when a postconviction petition is fully briefed, rule 65C(j)
specifically provides that the district court
may either hold "a hearing or otherwise

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Westlaw.
171 P.3d426
171 P.3d 426, 589 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2007 UT 80
(Cite as: 171 P.3d 426)
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H

be relevant to its adjudication.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Lemuel PRION, Plaintiff and Petitioner,

Utah,2007.
Prion v. State
171 P.3d 426, 589 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2007 UT 80

v.

STATE of Utah, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 20070570.

END OF DOCUMENT
Oct. 16,2007.
Eighth District, Vernal Dep't; The Honorable John
R. Anderson, No. 070800083.
Lemuel Prion, pro se, petitioner.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
PER CURIAM:
f 1 This matter is before the court upon a Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari filed on June 22, 2007.
K 2 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to rule 45
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari is granted, and the
court of appeals' affirmance of the district court's
judgment is summarily reversed.
K 3 Specifically, while the district court performed
an assessment of the accrual of petitioner's cause of
action for purposes of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act's (PCRA) statute of limitations, Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-35a-107(l), (2), it appears neither the
court of appeals nor the district court separately addressed the interests-of-justice exception to that
limitations period, section 78-35a-107(3). See also
Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, 123 P.3d 400, and authority cited therein. Also, neither court expressly
determined that the petition was frivolous on its
face or that it was procedurally barred by any other
distinct provision of the PCRA. Accordingly, this
matter should be remanded to address the interestsof-justice exception, as well as any other provisions
of the PCRA that have not been considered but may
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dispose of the case."Utah R. Civ. P.
65C(j). Thus, the district court has discretion whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, and the simple assertion that an evidentiary hearing should have been conducted is insufficient to show an abuse of this
discretion.
We affirm the dismi'sal »i I}HJ [Minimi for postconviction relief .rN2
FN2. Prion filed his own motion for summary reversal on the basis of manifest error. &eUtah R.App. P. 10(a)(2)(B). In
light of the disposition of this appeal, Prion's motion is denied.
Utah App.,2007.
Prion v. State
Not Reported in P.3d, 2007 WL 13t>bj81 (Utah
App.), 2007 UT App 163
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dismiss the appeal. See id.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK OM'RT
RULES BEFORE CITING.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Lemuel PRION, Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE of Utah, Respondent and Appellee.
No. 20080257-CA.
May 22, 2008.
Eighth District, Vernal Department, 070800083;
The Honorable John R. Anderson.
Lemuel Prion, Draper, Appellant Pro Se.

Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides that a trial court may extend the time to
appeal for good cause. SeeUtah R.App. P. 4(e). A
motion to extend the time to appeal must be filed
no later than thirty days after the initial appeal time
has expired. See id. Prion's motion was due no later
than February 19, 2008, but it was not filed until
February 21. Accordingly, the motion was untimely
and the trial court could not consider it. SeeUtah
R.App. P. 2 (stating that the time frames in rule
4(e) cannot be suspended). Because the motion to
extend the time to appeal was untimely, the notice
of appeal is untimely and this court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.FN1

Before Judges BILLINGS, DAVIS, and McHUGH.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM.
*1 Lemuel Prion seeks to appeal the trial court's
dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.
This is before the court on its own motion for summary disposition. Because this court lacks jurisdiction, it must dismiss the appeal.
The trial court entered its order on December 18,
2007. Prion filed a motion for an extension of time
to appeal, along with a notice of appeal, on February 21, 2008. The motion for an extension was untimely and, therefore, so was the notice of appeal.

FNL Prion asserts that the trial court erred
when it sentenced him to a harsher sentence at resentencing. Although this court
cannot reach the issue in this appeal because it lacks jurisdiction, Prion may be
able to raise the issue in the context of
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e),
which has no time bar. SeeUtah R.Crim. P.
22(e).
Utah App.,2008.
Prion v. State
Not Reported in P.3d, 2008 \\i, 2132834 (Utah
App.), 2008 UT App 189
END OF DOCUMENT

A notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days
after the entry of the order appealed. SeeUtah
R.App. P. 4(a). The timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT
100, K 5, 57 P.3d 1065. If a notice of appeal is not
timely filed, this court lacks jurisdiction and must
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T \ ^ % J \ '' / ?
'$£
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF U T A H N ^ m ^ ° <%fy ^
^ P ^

RULING AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE

State of Utah,
Plaintiff,
vs.

.
Case No. 941800068

Lemuel Prion,

Judge JOHN R. ANDERSON

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.
Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a court to correct an illegal
sentence at any time.
On September 151994, this Court found that the Defendant was mentally ill The Court
imposed sentences for the three crimes the Defendant committed and ordered the sentences to
run concurrently. The Court ordered the Defendant to be committed to the Department of
Corrections for care and treatment for no more than 18 months, or until the Defendant reached
maximum benefit. The Court ordered that after that period of care and treatment, the Defendant
would be brought before the Court for reconsideration of his sentence.
On March 15, 1995, the Defendant was brought before the Court for sentencing. The
Court imposed sentences for the three crimes the Defendant committed and ordered the sentences
to run consecutively.
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The Defendant argues that the sentence imposed was illegal because it violated his right
to be free of double jeopardy. Specifically, the Defendant argues that when he was sentenced
after the 18 month period in the State Hospital, he received a longer sentence.
The Double Jeopardy Clause states "[n]or shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . .." U.S. Const amend V. u[T]he Double
Jeopardy Clause protects defendants against multiple punishments, as well as multiple
prosecutions, for the same crime." State v. Maguire, 975 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah App. 1999).
However, the Double Jeopardy Clause only protects against re-sentencing when the defendant
reasonably believes the original sentence is final. Id. at 479.
Utah Code Ann. §77-16a-202(b) allows a court to recall the sentence and commitment,
and re-sentence the offender after the offender has been in the State Hospital for the specified
period of time. Here, the Defendant had no reasonable expectation that the September 1, 1994,
sentence was final because the Court specifically stated that the Defendant's sentence would be
reconsidered after the 18 month period. Therefore, the Defendant's sentence did not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause and was not illegal.
The Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence is denied.

/ JOHN R. ANDERSON, District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 941800068 by the method and on the date
specified.
MAIL: LEMUEL PRION UTAH STATE PRISON, #23738 P.O. BOX 2b J DRAPER,
UT 84020-0250
BY HAND:

JOANN B STRINGHAM

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 20090380-CA

v.

r 1 L h D
(August 13, 2009)

Lemuel Prion,
2009 UT App 219
Defendant and Appellant.

Eighth District, Vernal Department, 931800470
The Honorable John R. Anderson
Attorneys:

Lemuel Prion, Draper, Appellant Pro Se
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Davis.
PER CURIAM:
Lemuel Prion appeals the district court's order denying his
motion to correct an illegal sentence. This matter is before us
on a sua sponte motion for summary disposition. We affirm.
Utah Code section 77-16a-202(b) permits the district court
to sentence an offender to a term of imprisonment and order that
the offender first be committed to the Department of Human
Services for treatment until the offender's condition has been
stabilized, but in no case shall the offender be committed for
more than eighteen months. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202 (b)
(2008). At the expiration of an offender's treatment, "the court
may recall the sentence and commitment, and resentence the
offender." Id. A commitment and retention of the district
court's jurisdiction under Utah Code section 77-16a-202(b) "shall
be specified in the sentencing order." Id.
Prion asserts that the district court violated his
constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy when it
recalled his sentence, pursuant to section 77-16a-202(b), and
determined to run the sentences consecutively rather than
concurrently. This court previously determined that the double
jeopardy clause "only proscribes resentencing where the defendant

has developed a legitimate expectation of the finality in his
original sentence." State v. Macruire, 1999 UT App 45, t 8, 975
P.2d 476. Thus, where there is no legitimate expectation of
finality in the first proceeding, there can be no violation of
double jeopardy protections. See id.
As required by Utah Code section 77-16a-202(b), the
September 1, 19 94 order provided that the district court retained
jurisdiction to alter or amend its originally contemplated
sentence. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(b). Additionally, the
September 1, 1994 order expressly indicated that Prion's sentence
would be reconsidered once he was released from his mental health
treatment. Thus, we cannot say that Prion could legitimately
expect that the September 1, 1994 order constituted his final
sentence. Accordingly, the district court did not violate
Prion's constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy.1

Affirmed.
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Pamela T. Greenwood,
P r e s i d i n g Judge
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Russell W. Bench, Judge

James %/.Davis,
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1. Prion raises additional issues on appeal. We determine that
those issues lack merit and do not address them.
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